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Abstract
Recently, deep learning has been applied to many
security-sensitive applications, such as facial au-
thentication. The existence of adversarial exam-
ples hinders such applications. The state-of-the-
art result on defense shows that adversarial training
can be applied to train a robust model on MNIST
against adversarial examples; but it fails to achieve
a high empirical worst-case accuracy on a more
complex task, such as CIFAR-10 and SVHN. In our
work, we propose curriculum adversarial training
(CAT) to resolve this issue. The basic idea is to
develop a curriculum of adversarial examples gen-
erated by attacks with a wide range of strengths.
With two techniques to mitigate the catastrophic
forgetting and the generalization issues, we demon-
strate that CAT can improve the prior art’s empiri-
cal worst-case accuracy by a large margin of 25%
on CIFAR-10 and 35% on SVHN. At the same, the
model’s performance on non-adversarial inputs is
comparable to the state-of-the-art models.
1 Introduction
Recently, deep learning has achieved the state-of-the-art per-
formance on many tasks, such as images classification [He
et al., 2016], game playing [Silver et al., 2016], and speech
recognition [Hinton et al., 2012], and has been applied to
many security- and safety-sensitive applications, such as au-
tonomous driving [Chen et al., 2015] and facial authentica-
tion [Sun et al., 2014]. However, the existence of adversarial
examples severely hinders the application of deep learning
to these problems [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al.,
2015].
Since [Szegedy et al., 2013], many efforts have been de-
voted to investigate different attacks leveraging adversarial
examples [Papernot et al., 2016a; Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Liu et al., 2017; Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2017] and defenses [Papernot et al., 2016b;
Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018; Jacob Buckman,
2018; Xu et al., 2018]. Although many defense strategies
have been proposed, almost all of them are shown to be bro-
ken when the attacker can adapt the attack to take the de-
fense into consideration [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; 2017a;
He et al., 2017]. It has been several years that the community
is unclear whether building a robust model is even possible.
A recent work from [Madry et al., 2018] provides the first
positive answer. The idea is straightforward: during training,
∗The work is done at UC Berkeley
the model is trained with not only standard training data, but
also adversarial examples generated from an attack. Such an
approach is referred to as adversarial training, and has been
exploited by many existing works [Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Kurakin et al., 2017; Li et al., 2016]. [Madry et al., 2018]
provide two insights on why previous adversarial training ap-
proaches cannot train a robust model: (1) the model should
have a sufficiently large capacity; and (2) strong attacks
should be used to generate the adversarial examples during
training. In doing so, [Madry et al., 2018] show that, slightly
imprecisely speaking, adversarial training can result in a ro-
bust model for MNIST [LeCun, 1998] with an empricial
worst-case test accuracy of around 90%. That is, for around
90% of the test data, no known attacks can generate effective
adversarial examples. Although this result is encouraging, the
approach does not generalize well to a slightly more difficult
task, such as CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky, 2009]. In particular,
[Madry et al., 2018] can only achieve an empirical worst-
case test accuracy of around 45% on CIFAR-10 and 40% on
SVHN.
In this work, we follow the line of research on the ad-
versarial training framework, and design a training tech-
nique, called curriculum adversarial training (CAT). Com-
pared with [Madry et al., 2018], CAT is both more effec-
tive and more efficient. We offer two novel insights on ad-
versarial training: (1) although [Madry et al., 2018] show
that strong attacks should be used in an adversarial train-
ing framework, we show that weak attacks are also useful
to mitigate a catastrophic forgetting issue; and (2) quanti-
zation can effectively help our CAT technique to achieve
better generalization. Note that, quantization has been ex-
ploited in existing works as a defense [Xu et al., 2018;
Jacob Buckman, 2018]; however, [He et al., 2017] and [An-
ish Athalye, 2018] show that quantization alone can be easily
broken. Our work is the first to demonstrate that quantization
can significantly improve the robustness of a model against
adversarial examples using the CAT approach.
We evaluate our approach on CIFAR-10 and SVHN [Net-
zer et al., 2011], and compare our approach against the state-
of-the-art approach from [Madry et al., 2018]. We observe
that our approach can consistently improve the empirical
worst-case accuracy: from 46.18% to 69.27% on CIFAR-
10, and from 40.38% to 75.66% on SVHN. Also, on non-
adversarial test data, the accuracy of models trained using
our approach decreases the performance of the state-of-the-
art models by at most 6%. Therefore, CAT has potentials to
be deployed in practice to achieve a robust model.
RelatedWork. Since adversarial examples were first demon-
strated [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015], it has
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been several years that researchers are forming an army race
to propose attacks [Papernot et al., 2016a; Liu et al., 2017;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017]
and defenses [Papernot et al., 2016b; Kurakin et al., 2017;
Madry et al., 2018; Jacob Buckman, 2018; Xu et al., 2018].
To date, most defenses have been shown to be broken [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017b; 2017a; He et al., 2017].
Despite such a negative result, [Madry et al., 2018] pro-
pose an adversarial training approach, and no one has shown
any effective attacks to break the MNIST model trained using
this approach so far. However, [Madry et al., 2018] have not
shown that the approach can be extended to handle a more
complex task such as CIFAR-10 or SVHN. Our work follows
this direction to improve the adversarial training framework
on these harder tasks in terms of both efficiency and empirical
worst-case accuracy against adversarial examples.
It is worth mentioning that, since [Madry et al., 2018],
researchers also consider an alternative line to construct a
model that is provably secure by construction [Kolter and
Wong, 2017; Aditi Raghunathan, 2018; Aman Sinha, 2018].
These approaches exploit the structure of the neural network,
and thus heavily rely on the choice of the neural network ar-
chitecture. Due to this limitation, these approaches are only
shown to be provably robust on MNIST, and it is unclear how
to apply them to more complex tasks such as CIFAR-10.
2 Adversarial examples and adversarial
training
In this section, we first present the problem of finding adver-
sarial examples, and then present the generic framework of
adversarial training to train a robust model against adversar-
ial examples.
2.1 Adversarial examples
Given a network fθ(·) and an input x, whose ground truth
label is y, an adversarial example x? is an input such that
fθ(x
?) 6= y ∧ d(x, x?) ≤  (1)
Here, d(·, ·) is a distance metric to quantify the semantic dis-
tance between the two inputs x and x? is small enough, so
that they share the same ground truth.
As in most existing works, we focus on adversarial exam-
ples to the image domain. That is, the input space contains all
images of the same size. Therefore, the two images x and x?
can be represented as two vectors. There have been some dis-
tance metrics considered in the literature, such as Lp norm of
x−x? for p = 0 [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b], p = 1 [Sharma
and Chen, 2018], p = 2 [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017b], and p =∞ [Madry et al., 2018;
Goodfellow et al., 2015]. In this work, we follow [Madry et
al., 2018] to consider d(x, x′) = L∞(x− x?). However, we
emphasize that our approach can be easily adapted to other
distance metrics.
2.2 Adversarial example attacks
Finding an adversarial example is equivalent to solving the
satisfiability problem of (1). However, directly solving it is
hard. Most existing adversarial example attacks convert (1)
into the following optimization problem:
argmax
x?
L(fθ(x?), y) (2)
s.t. d(x, x?) ≤  (3)
Here, L is a loss function between a prediction fθ(x?) and
the ground truth y. Intuitively, once the loss function is max-
imized, it is more likely that fθ(x?) 6= y.
Different approaches have been proposed to solve the
above optimization problem. For the L∞ norm distance met-
ric, we explain two state-of-the-art approaches below, Itera-
tive optimization attack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b] and Pro-
jected Gradient Descent (PGD) [Madry et al., 2018]. We will
also explain the strength of attacks, and the idea of black-box
attacks, which are effective at bypassing many defenses.
Iterative optimization attack. The Carlini and Wagner’s
L∞ attack optimizes the following term
x?
argmin
− ξL(fθ(x?), y) +
∑
i
ReLU((x? − x)i − τ)
where ξ is a hyper-parameter to be empirically determined,
and τ is initialized with , and decreased by a factor of 0.9×
when the second term becomes zero.
Intuitively, minimizing the first term is equivalent to maxi-
mizing (2), while when second term is minimized, i.e., to be
0, then the constraint (3) is satisfied. ξ is a hyper-parameter
to balance the two terms in the objective. The iterative op-
timization attack is generally regarded as the state-of-the-art
attack.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). A PGD(k) algorithm
is parameterized with k, indicating the number of iterations.
The basic idea is to optimize (2) using an iterative gradient
descent algorithm:
xi+1 ← Ω(xi + 
k
sgn (∇xL(fθ(xi), y)
)
where x0 is set with x, and sgn(·) converts each dimen-
sion of a vector to its sign (i.e., {−1, 0,+1}). Ω(·) is a
projection function to ensure that each dimension of the in-
put is projected to be in a valid range (i.e., [0, 1]): Ω(v)i =
clip(vi, 0, 1). Since ||sgn(·)||∞ ≤ 1 holds for any input, it is
easy to show that ||xi − x0||∞ ≤ i/k. Therefore, the final
output x? = xk satisfies ||x? − x||∞ ≤ , which is constraint
(3). It is worth noting that an earlier approach called Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS) [Goodfellow et al., 2015] is a special
instance of PGD(1).
Attack strength. Now we take a detour to introduce the con-
cepts of weak attacks versus strong attacks. Intuitively, weak
attacks refer to those attacks that are easy to defend against,
while strong attacks are hard. For example, FGS [Goodfel-
low et al., 2015] is generally regarded as a weak attack, and
many defenses [Papernot et al., 2016b; Kurakin et al., 2017]
have been demonstrated effective against FGS attacks. On
the other hand, the iterative optimization attack is considered
strong, and it is shown to be effective at breaking many de-
fenses against FGS.
Mathematically, all attacks can be viewed as an approxi-
mation to the optimum of Objective (2) under Constraint (3).
Thus, the strength of an attack can be measured by how close
it can approximate the true optimum. From this point of view,
PGD(k) can be viewed as a class of attacks whose strength is
parameterized by k. That is, the larger the value of k is, a
finer-grained approximation the result is, and thus a stronger
attack it is.
Our curriculum adversarial training framework relies on
the existence of an attack class whose strength can be param-
eterized. Clearly, by parameterizing the number of iterations
used to generate an adversarial example, we can easily cre-
ate different attack classes for other distance metrics as well.
Therefore, although we focus on L∞ norm distance, our ap-
proach can be adapted to other distance metrics as well.
Black-box attacks. All above discussed attacks assume that
the parameters of the model θ is known, so that a deriva-
tion of L can be computed. We refer to such an attack
as white-box attacks. When an attack does not rely on the
knowledge of θ, we call them black-box attacks. There
have been several approaches to show black-box attacks
are possible due to transferability [Papernot et al., 2016a;
Liu et al., 2017]. The basic idea is that, the attacker can
train a substitute model f ′θ′ on the same task and generates
adversarial examples against f ′θ′ ; then these adversarial ex-
amples will also be misclassified by the target model fθ even
though the model f ′θ′ may be very different from the target fθ.
Such a black-box attack can bypass many defenses that rely
on making the model non-differentiable to prevent gradient-
based attacks.
2.3 Adversarial training
A natural idea for building a robust model is to minimize the
upper bound of (2) for all inputs. That is, finding the saddle
point of the following objective [Madry et al., 2018]:
argmin
θ
max
(x,y)∈D
max
d(x,x?)≤
L(fθ(x?), y) (4)
where D is a dataset (e.g., a training set or a test set). The
basic idea for adversarial retraining is to solve (4) using an
alternative optimization approach. That is, the algorithm iter-
atively does the following two steps:
1. Fixing all x?, optimize θ for the outer minimization
problem; and
2. Fixing θ, finding the worst-case adversarial examples x?
for the inner maximization problem.
This procedure is called an adversarial training algorithm,
and summarized in Algorithm 1.
Albeit its conceptual simplicity, earlier attempts instantiat-
ing the algorithm using FGS as G do not result in a robust
model [Kurakin et al., 2017]. Only until recently, [Madry et
al., 2018] shows that adversarial training can be used to ob-
tain a robust MNIST model. That is, the worst-case accuracy
on MNIST test data can be no lower than 88% even though
the attacker knows all parameters of the model. The two key
observations from Madry et al. are (1) strong attacks should
be used in the second step to obtain a robust model; and (2)
the model should have a sufficiently large capacity (e.g., the
Algorithm 1 Adversarial Training (AT(D, N, η,G))
Input: Training data D; Total iterations N ; Learning rate η
Input: An attack G
Output: θ
1: Randomly initialize network θ
2: for i ← 0 to N do
3: Sample a batch (xi, yi) ∼ D
4: Generate adversarial examples x?i ← G(xi, yi)
5: θ ← θ − η∑i∇θL(fθ(x?i ), yi)
// This is standard SGD; it can be replaced by
other training algorithms such as Adam
6: end for
number of parameters). In particular, [Madry et al., 2018] in-
stantiates G with PGD(40) to achieve a robust MNIST model.
Although their results are encouraging, when the algorithm
is extended to handle more complex tasks, such as CIFAR-
10 or SVNH, the vanilla adversarial training algorithm from
[Madry et al., 2018] cannot achieve an empirical worst-case
accuracy higher than 46% on CIFAR-10 and 40% on SVHN.
3 Curriculum adversarial training
In this section, we present our optimized adversarial training
approach, called curriculum adversarial training (CAT). In
the following, we first present the basic idea of curriculum
adversarial training (Section 3.1), and then present two opti-
mizations, including batch mixing (Section 3.2) and quanti-
zation (Section 3.3), for better performance.
3.1 Basic curriculum adversarial training
The problem with Madry et al.’s adversarial training algo-
rithm is that it starts training the model from a strong attack
generated by PGD(k), (i.e., k = 40 for MNIST and k = 7 for
CIFAR-10). In each training iteration, since it always finds
the “worst-case” input using a strong attack, adversarial train-
ing seems to overfit to the attack in use and does not general-
ize to test data. As a result, Madry et al.’s approach is hard to
achieve a high test accuracy on test data.
Our basic idea to mitigate these issues is to design a train-
ing curriculum. That is, the model is first trained with a weak
attack; once the model can achieve a high accuracy against at-
tacks at some strength, the attack strength is increased. This
process continues until the attack strength reaches an upper
bound specified by the defender.
The entire procedure is described in Algorithm 2. In this
algorithm, A(k) denotes an attack class parameterized with
k indicating the attack strength. In our work, we instantiate
A with PGD. We use AT to denote the standard adversarial
training algorithm (Algorithm 1). The parameter n is set to
be |D|/batch− size, so that each adversarial training call on
line 4 is doing one epoch of adversarial training over D.
Each iteration of the main loop (line 3-6) is called a lesson
l in the curriculum. In the first lesson l = 0, the model is
trained with A(0), which indicates that the training data is
directly fed into the training algorithm without generating any
adversarial examples. After each epoch, we evaluate the l˜-
accuracy on V and if it is not increased for the last 10 epoches,
Algorithm 2 Curriculum Adversarial Training (Basic)
Input: Training data D; Validation data V; Epoch iterations
n; Learning rate η; Maximal attack strength K;
Input: An class of attacks, denoted as A(k) whose strength
is parameterized by k.
Output: θ
1: Randomly initialize network θ
2: for l ← 0 to K do
3: repeat
4: θ ← AT(D, n, η,A(l))
5: // One epoch of adversarial training using A(l)
6: until l˜-accuracy on V not increased for 10 epochs
7: end for
we increase the attack strength l. Here, we use k˜-accuracy to
denote the percentage of examples in the validation set that
no attacks in A(i) for i = 0, ..., l can generate successful
adversarial examples. Formally, we have
k˜-accuracy(V, θ)
=
|{(x, y) ∈ V|∀i ∈ {0, ..., k}.fθ
(A(i)(x)) = y}|
|V| (5)
When the model’s validation k˜-accuracy has not been up-
dated in the last 10 epochs, we reset the parameters of the
model to be the best ones (i.e., 10 epochs ago) on the valida-
tion set before increasing k.
The basic idea is that, while training adversarially with at-
tacks A(k) at a certain strength k, we evaluate all attacks no
stronger than A(k) on the validation set to moniter whether
the model is overfitting. Once the model achieves the best
validation performance using the current attack strength, we
increase the attack strength to supervise the model with more
challenging tasks. In doing so, we adversarially train the
model with a designed curriculum from weaker attacks to
stronger attacks.
3.2 Batch mixing
Although the basic curriculum training can achieve a signifi-
cantly reduction on the training time, it does not increase the
robustness. We observe that one issue is forgetting: when the
model is trained with a stronger attack (i.e., for a larger l), it
will forget the adversarial examples generated for a smaller
l. As a result, the basic curriculum training cannot achieve a
high empirical worst-case accuracy.
To mitigate this problem, when training with a strong at-
tack, we also need to make the model remember the adver-
sarial examples generated by weaker attacks. That is, to form
a batch, instead of generating all adversarial examples us-
ing PGD(l), we generate some adversarial examples using
PGD(i) for each i ∈ {0, 1, ..., l}, and combine them to form
a batch. We refer to such a technique as batch mixing.
As a result, the loss function to compute its gradient (line
5 Algorithm 1) is
k∑
i=0
αi
∑
(x,y)∼D
L(fθ(A(i)(x)), y)
where αi are the hyper-parameters such that ∀i.αi ∈ [0, 1]
and
∑l
i=0 αi = 1. In practice, we observe that setting
αi =
1
l+1 and generating the same amount of adversar-
ial examples for each attack strength are effective enough.
With batch mixing, we observe that the model trained with a
strong attack can also remember most adversarial examples
for weaker attacks, and thus yield a better overall accuracy.
3.3 Quantization
Another problem with curriculum adversarial training is at-
tack generalization. That is, the model trained with CAT may
not defend against attacks that are stronger than the strongest
attack used during training. We mitigate this problem by em-
ploying quantization. Intuitively, each input x is a vector of
real values from [0, 1]. However, we can restrict each input
dimension to be a b-bit integer rather than a real value. This
technique is referred to as quantization.
In particular, quantization is an inference time technique
to reduce the space of adversarial examples. Given any test
input, the model will first convert each pixel value into a b-
bit integer, before feeding it into the neural network. Without
quantization, the difference of x? − x can take any real value
from [−,+]m, where m is the input dimension. This is an
infinite space. In contrast, when the inputs are quantized to be
b-bit integer vectors, 2bx? can only take an integer value from
[d2b(x − )e, d2b(x + )e]m, which is a finite space. We re-
fer to this space as the adversarial example space. Therefore,
the smaller b is, the smaller the adversarial example space is
but the less effective the model may be, since the input may
contain too little information. Therefore, the choice of b is
a trade-off between resilience against adversarial examples,
and the effectiveness of the model. In our evaluation, we ob-
serve that choosing b = 4 is the best choice.
Quantiziation has been proposed by [Xu et al., 2018] as
one of the feature squeezing techniques. However, this tech-
nique alone is not shown to provide resilience against strong
white-box attacks. When used in the adversarial training
framework, in contrast, CAT can effectively train the model
to remember as many instances in the adversarial example
space as possible, with a reasonably weak attack. That is, al-
though a stronger attack can better optimize the loss function,
the adversarial examples that it generates are highly likely to
coincide with those generated by a weaker attack, because the
entire adversarial example space is small. In our evaluation,
we observe that quantiziation can effectively improve the ac-
curacy against stronger attacks than the model is observed
during training.
4 Evaluation Setup
In this work, we evaluate our approach against the state-
of-the-art approach [Madry et al., 2018] on CIFAR-10, and
SVHN. As we mentioned in Section 2, we use L∞ to derive
the distance between benign data and adversarial examples.
We set the hyper-parameters for different data sets to be the
same as used in the literature:
For both datasets, we use two state-of-the-art image clas-
sification architectures: ResNet-50 [He et al., 2016] and
CIFAR-10 SVHN
ResNet-50 DenseNet-161 ResNet-50 DenseNet-161
Ours 65.93% 69.27% 75.66% 74.58%
[Madry et al., 2018] 45.39% 46.18% 19.59% 40.38%
Table 1: Empricial worst-case accuracy using our approach versus baselines on CIFAR-10 and SVHN. “Ours” indicate the CAT approach
with all optimizations applied. The best results are in bold.
Dataset Bound K used in
CIFAR-10 8/255 7 [Madry et al., 2018]
SVHN 12/255 10 [Jacob Buckman, 2018]
DenseNet-161 [Huang et al., 2017]. Mini-batch size is set
to be 200 for all our approaches.
Empirical worst-case accuracy. Although we have men-
tioned it several times, we formally define empirical worst-
case accuracy now. In particular, for each test input x, we
generate adversarial examples using different algorithms; if
one of these adversarial examples can mislead the evaluated
model, we mark input x as failed. Then empirical worst-case
accuracy is evaluated as the percentage of test cases that do
not fail. Note that this approach does not guarantee to find
real worst case adversarial example; however, it empirically
approximates the worst case when a wide range of attacks are
employed. In particular, we include the following attacks.
• The iterative optimization attack [Carlini and Wagner,
2017b];
• PGD(k) for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 50, 100};
• Black-box attacks.
We also refer to empirical worst-case accuracy as resilience
for short, and use the two terms interchangably.
5 Evaluation results
In this section, we first present the evaluation results to show
that our curriculum adversarial training approach can improve
the resilience over [Madry et al., 2018] on different tasks and
different models. Then, we will perform ablation studies to
study the effectiveness of each component. We will also doc-
ument the forgetting phenomenon and the attack generaliza-
tion issue which motivate the design of quantization and batch
mixing respectively.
5.1 Resilience comparison
In this subsection, we first compare our curriculum adversar-
ial training strategy against [Madry et al., 2018]. The results
are presented in Table 1. We can observe that on all datasets,
our CAT approah can outperform the prior-art. Especially, on
CIFAR-10 and SVHN, the margin ranges from 25% to 35%.
Note that on CIFAR-10, the best model reported in [Madry et
al., 2018] is WideResNet, which can achieve 47% empirical
worst-case accuracy. Comparing with this result, applying
our CAT technique to DenseNet-161 can still improve it by
24%.
On SVHN, we observe that ResNet-50 trained with [Madry
et al., 2018] is unexpectedly bad at defending against ad-
versarial examples. We observe that its training accuracy is
not improving over a long period of time. We conduct san-
ity checks of our implementation, and find no obvious bugs.
One potential reason is that ResNet-50 may not be sufficiently
large.
We notice that our replication of [Madry et al., 2018] using
DenseNet-161 can achieve an accuracy as high as 88% under
attack PGD(10), which is used during adversarial training.
However, we observe that the model achieving 88% under
PGD(10) performs poorly on stronger attacks: the accuracy
drops to 9% for PGD(50) and 5% for PGD(100). As a re-
sult, the empirical worst-case accuracy of this model, which
overfits to PGD(10), is lower than 5%. In light of this issue,
we obtain the model achieving the best empirical worst-case
accuracy on the validation set during training, rather than the
model overfitting to PGD(10). In doing so, we observe that
this model’s accuracy under all strong attacks (i.e., PGD(k)
with k ≥ 3) is 40% to 50%; and as a result, the empirical
worst-case accuracy is 40.38% as reported in Table 1. With
respect to this result, our evaluation shows that our CAT ap-
proach can improve [Madry et al., 2018] by a margin of 35%.
The only other independent replication of [Madry et
al., 2018] is from [Jacob Buckman, 2018], who report an
accuracy of [Madry et al., 2018] under PGD(10) to be
59.63%. One may wonder whether [Jacob Buckman, 2018]
achieve better resilience on SVHN. While they claim they
achieve a better performance under white-box attacks (i.e.,
94.77%), [Jacob Buckman, 2018]’s accuracy against black-
box attacks is very low (i.e., 48.67%). Thus, based on our
metric, their approach’s empirical worst-case accuracy is at
most 48.67%; and our approach outperforms [Jacob Buck-
man, 2018] by at least, i.e., 27%.
It is worth to mention that, on SVHN, a concurrent work,
[Kolter and Wong, 2017], provides a model with provable re-
silience of at least 59.33%. The empirical worst case accu-
racy of their approach is at most 65.48%; thus our approach
outperforms it by a margin of at least 10%.
5.2 Detailed analysis
In this section, we present some detailed analysis of the pro-
posed techniques over previous approach. Most of the dis-
cussion will be based on ablation study results presented in
Table 2. In the following, we will discuss the results with
respect to various questions.
The effectiveness of CAT. We first document the effective-
ness of basic curriculum adversarial training to overcome the
overfitting problem of [Madry et al., 2018]. In particular, we
show the validation and test empirical worst-case accuracy
over time of both our approach and [Madry et al., 2018].
In Figure 1, we plot the empirical worst-case accuracy
on the test data (i.e., test resilience) of both our CAT ap-
CIFAR-10
AT AT+Quant Basic Basic+Quant MIX MIX+Quant Basic+MIX CAT
ResNet-50 45.39% 46.27% 41.09% 62.78% 38.69% 39.90% 2.85% 65.93%
DenseNet-161 46.18% 47.04% 41.40% 61.25% 33.82% 35.33% 1.20% 69.27%
SVHN
AT AT+Quant Basic Basic+Quant MIX MIX+Quant Basic+MIX CAT
ResNet-50 19.59% 19.59% 0.00% 62.39% 32.65% 72.67% 0.43% 75.66%
DenseNet-161 40.38% 61.86% 0.01% 67.79% 29.03% 41.88% 0.25% 74.58%
Table 2: Ablation study. Empirical worst-case accuracy is reported. “AT” indicates vanilla adversarial training approach. “Basic” indicates
using the curriculum; “Quant” indicates using quantization; and “MIX” indicates using batch mixing.
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Figure 1: Training and testing empirical worst-case accuracy of
vanilla adversarial training and curriculum adversarial training over
time. The model is ResNet-50, and the dataset is CIFAR-10.
proach and [Madry et al., 2018]’s approach. The validation
resilience’s figure is similar, and thus we omit it. From the
figure, we can observe that AT soon achieves a better test re-
silience, because from the very beginning, the model sees ad-
versarial examples generated from strong attacks; but it hits
the peak at around 45% and then starts dropping. At the same
time, we observe that the training resilience curve of AT con-
tinues increasing. Therefore, AT overfits to the training data,
and does not generalize to the test data.
On the other hand, we observe that CAT’s test resilience
bypasses AT about the same time as AT hits the peak after
simpler lessons (i.e., l = 4) are finished, and continues to
increase to above 60%. Therefore, we conclude that our CAT
technique can effectively overcome the overfitting problem of
AT.
The forgetting phenomenon. During basic curriculum ad-
versarial training, we observe that when the model finishes
lesson l, the model achieves the highest accuracy under at-
tack k = l. However, when continuing to train with harder
lessons, the accuracy under attack PGD(k) may drop signif-
icantly. Figure 2 illustrates such an example on ResNet-50
models on SVHN dataset. We can observe that the accuracy
against PGD(6) and PGD(7) increases to almost 100% after
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Figure 2: Catastrophic forgetting phenomenon on SVHN using
ResNet-50. The plots show the accuracy under PGD attacks un-
der different strength. We use basic curriculum adversarial training
to train the model. The x-axis correspond to the different lessons in
the curriculum.
lesson l = 7; but when training with lesson l = 9, the ac-
curacy of attack PGD(6) drops to below 10%. This illustrate
that the model entirely forgets its training on lesson l = 6, and
thus we refer to this as a catastrophic forgetting phenomenon.
The same phenomenon can be observed with PGD(7) attack
as well.
The effectiveness of batch mixing. We now show that batch
mixing can effectively mitigate the issue caused by forgetting.
We present the l˜-accuracy defined by (5) using basic curricu-
lum adversarial training (Basic) and basic curriculum adver-
sarial training enhanced with batch mixing (Basic+MIX) in
Table 3 for comparison. We can observe that Basic+MIX can
consistently improve the performance over Basic by a mar-
gin ranging from 5.88% to 68.3%. Especially, on SVHN, the
reason why the empirical worst-case accuracy of Basic is as
low as around 10% is because of the forgetting phenomenon
as documented above. Therefore, our batch mixing technique
can effectively mitigate this issue. Also, we can observe from
Table 3 that Basic+MIX can outperform AT on l˜-accuracy
as well. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of batch
mixing.
However, if we examine the empirical worst-case accuracy
in Table 2, we observe that the performance of Basic+MIX
is extremely bad, i.e., less than 6%. This is mainly because
of the attack generalization issue that will be discussed next.
CIFAR-10 SVHN
ResNet DenseNet ResNet DenseNet
AT 45.78% 46.67% 19.59% 55.98%
Basic 67.48% 63.85% 10.72% 8.25%
Basic+MIX 73.36% 73.05% 79.02% 65.16%
Table 3: l˜-accuracy for l = 7 (for CIFAR-10) and l = 10 (for
SVHN)
By including quantization (+Quant) to mitigate this issue, we
again observe that Basic+MIX+Quant, which is equivalent to
the full CAT approach can outperform all other baselines.
The attack generalization issue. As we have discussed
above, by using curriculum adversarial training with batch
mixing, the K˜-accuracy is high, which indicates that the
model can effectively defend against all attacks weaker than
PGD(K). However, we observe in various places that for at-
tacks stronger than PGD(K), the accuracy may drop signif-
icantly. Therefore, a model trained with weaker attacks may
not generalize to stronger attacks. We refer to this effect as
the attack generalization issue.
One naive idea to mitigate this issue is to increase the upper
bound onK; however, this idea clearly cannot solve the prob-
lem since we cannot train with an infinitely large K. There-
fore, no matter how large we choose K, there may always be
stronger attacks than PGD(K) that can break the defense.
The effectiveness of quantization. Since quantization is an
inference time defense, it can be used by any combinations
of models, datasets, and training techniques. In Table 2, we
observe that quantization (+Quant) improves the performance
on almost all such combinations. The reason is because quan-
tization can effectively reduce the attack space, so that even
stronger attacks cannot find more sub-optimal solutions to the
attack optimization problem (2) than weaker attacks when the
input pixel values are quantized to a few bits. From Table 2,
we also observe that quantization also helps to improve the
resilience of AT from [Madry et al., 2018]. Therefore, we
confirm that quantization is a generic defense tool to work
with a wide range of other defense techniques.
Does batch mixing replace the role of curriculum? From
above, we have observed that batch mixing can help curricu-
lum adversarial training. A natural question is that whether
the curriculum is helpful or not? In fact, since it makes the
model be supervised with both adversarial examples gener-
ated from weaker attacks and from stronger ones, batch mix-
ing may potentially replace the role of the curriculum. To an-
swer this, in Table 2, we report this comparison by showing
the resilience by using the curriculum (i.e., Basic) or not. The
most significant phenomenon is that CAT, which is equiv-
alent to Basic+MIX+Quant, outperforms batch mixing with
quantization but without curriculum (MIX+Quant) by a large
margin in most cases. This clearly demonstrates that the cur-
riculum is important to achieve a high resilience.
However, we also observe that compared with MIX only,
Basic+MIX’s performance is much worse. The reason has
been explained above: the model trained with Basic+MIX is
CIFAR-10 SVHN
ResNet DenseNet ResNet DenseNet
Regular 94.31% 95.70% 95.66% 96.65%
CAT 88.49% 90.36% 95.30% 95.20%
Table 4: Evaluation results on pristine test set. ResNet indicates
ResNet-50; DenseNet indicates DenseNet-161. All results (includ-
ing CAT) are the test accuracy on non-adversarial inputs.
overfitting to PGD(k) attacks for k ≤ K, but is not resilient at
all to stronger attacks. In comparison, the model trained with
MIX sacrifices some resilience against with weaker attacks
to trade for more resilience against stronger attacks. When
quantization is deployed to effectively mitigate stronger at-
tacks, and thus the trade-off made by MIX is less necessary.
This is why we can observe a better overall resilience of CAT.
In summary, we conclude that the curriculum is a useful pro-
cedure to achieve high resilience, but it is better to be used
with batch mixing and quantization together.
Does CAT hurt regular accuracy? The last question is
whether adversarial training hurts the accuracy on non-attack
inputs. We conduct experiments to compare our CAT’s accu-
racy with the same model trained using their standard routine
on the same dataset. The results are presented in Table 4.
For SVHN, the accuracy drops around 1%; for CIFAR-10,
the drops are higher, but still within the range of 5% to 6%.
We attribute this to the fact that our training curriculum and
batch mixing consider non-adversarial inputs during training.
Such a performance loss is acceptable in many practical sce-
narios in trade of a better resilience.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we present curriculum adversarial training as a
defense mechanism to defend against adversarial example at-
tacks. It follows the adversarial training framework, which
has recently been shown effective by [Madry et al., 2018].
We make several innovations to significantly improve the al-
gorithm’s resilience. In particular, we propose a technique of
adversarial training to follow a curriculum containing adver-
sarial examples generated by attacks with various strength;
and we also show two effective optimizations called batch
mixing and quantization. By combining all the techniques,
we demonstrate that we can improve over previous state-of-
the-art by a margin ranging from 25% to 35%. Our work
sheds new light on further investigation directions on adver-
sarial training frameworks.
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